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Abstract
Understanding how laws are adjudicated on a local level can be just as significant as understanding their origins. Crime rates and how they fluctuate
relative to policing policies can reveal trends that can be traced back to social,
economic, and cultural influences. When comparing China, Mexico, and
Russia, we find that the similarities and differences can enlighten criminal
behavior by contrasting statistics with national identity. When taken into
the context of political development, effective policing policy could be extrapolated and identified.
To Protect and Serve
China, Mexico and Russia are constantly in the mainstream media, with
evocative occurrences dominating contemporary discussion. In the United
States, reports of police abuse fill the news cycle consistently. Regardless of
how one may feel about each report individually, it is an undeniable symptom

paideia
that a problem exists with the culture on either side of the badge. Some
think that the problem is institutional, but perhaps culture is the causal link
to public safety instead. A comparative look at the police forces in other
countries may shed some light. Mexico is constantly wracked by drug cartel
violence and general unrest. Russia, for most intents and purposes, appears to
have a relatively sound internal situation, yet an aggressive foreign strategy.
China is thrusting itself onto the world stage, proclaiming its adequacy and
controlling its domestic involvement. Policy implementation and adjudication at the lowest level, known as law enforcement, is clearly executed
better in China than in Russia, which is then better than Mexico. Why is it
that Mexico has experienced an institutional failure, while Russia has been
able to maintain a relatively ethical hold on its police force, and China has
been able to drastically reduce its crime? The answer lies in the political
development of the states, namely how their power dynamics have changed
recently. In Mexico, where bribes and exploitation of power are the norm,
the development of the country has led to the same systemic corruption that
is being fought in Russia. China uses corruption to its advantage. Mexico’s
system generates a higher per capita murder rate than Russia, as well as other
key crime statistics. The ability to combat these criminal numbers lies within
the strong authoritarian power of the contemporary Russian government.
The Russians are attempting to mitigate the same problems that Mexico
has encountered because they have the ability to reform their police force.
Some may argue that a country’s ability to fight crime simply relies on a
high police force per capita. After all, Mexico has 371.2 police officers per
100,000 people compared to Russia’s 522.0, as of 2013. In Mexico, there
were 18.9 murders per 100,000 people in 2013, compared to the 9.0 ratio
of Russia.1 However, China possesses 120 police officers per 100,000 in
2007, with a 1.2 ratio of the same metric. That same ratio was 2.0 in 2002,
and 0.8 in 2012.2 An argument can be made that the problem of ineffective
policing is not due to an inefficiency of resources, but that it is tied to the
citizenry and to the development of the country. Even though these countries
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have recently taken a departure from authoritarian governments, except for
China, which has only just departed from an ‘authoritarian’ economy, the
Russian social and political culture stands out as a more stable, law-abiding
society compared to Mexico. Mexican political development is characterized by three concepts relevant to law enforcement: unstable change, a mix
of interest articulation, and a weak society and weak state. Compared to
Russian political development, which consists of a strong society and state
and relatively strong interest articulation, (political changes in Russian history
are somewhat stable, though not always) Mexico opens a window for self-interested parties to manipulate the system. Chinese political development is
focused on a hierarchical structure of society, where one must ‘keep his/her
station’. Previously, Russian interest articulation was heavily “…regulated by
the Communist Party, and there could be no open, active competition among
political parties or interest groups for support…”3 This level of control is
similar to how China’s dual-rule system operates today. More recently, after
perestroika and glasnost, as well as the fall of the Soviet Union, Russians
have been more vocal about their ideologies, while still advocating for strong
state control. Russian activists now believe “… [that] institutionalism of
state power is a prerequisite for civil society development…” 4 This allows for
stronger participation in the political, and thus law making process. “… ‘[T]
rust in the [national] political system’ has the strongest influence on police
attitudes in nine Latin American countries… with citizens… [not expressing
confidence] in the less well-performing democrac[y]… of Mexico.”5 Mexico
is hindered by their lack of trust in a system that they cannot participate
in fully. Why should they continue to vote, rally, and caucus if someone is
going to sweep in by force and declare themselves the winner? “The…(in)
formal rules of municipal governance [in Mexico] result in a lack of horizontal
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accountability and reform continuity.”6 This distrust has generated a caustic
political outlook that cannot be sustained long-term.
China complicates this argument. Their authoritarian government is effectively accepted by the citizenry and social harmony is a core tenet of Chinese
culture. While one may argue that having a strong central power is what
keeps Chinese crime in check (crime meaning homicide rates in this case,
obviously there is a broad range of crimes to be compared, but for the purpose
of this paper, homicides will be used as a general indicator) asserting that
it is both an increase in economic prowess and overall Chinese culture that
maintains the low crime rates. The core beliefs of Confucianism necessitate
a rule of morality and benevolence. In contrast to Russian and Mexican cultural history, which typically generates a more violent sociological response.
While Chinese political history has hardly been pacifistic, Confucius created
a now ingrained idea of a harmonious hierarchy and social unity that brings
the Chinese people to behave more peacefully in their daily interaction with
one another compared to what we see in Russia and Mexico. One is expected
to live with the good of the society in mind, not in a self-serving way that
commonly breeds crime. This leads to the argument that moral obligations
could be the source of the differences in crime rates, not because of institutional guidance, but because of the public cultural psyche.
Corruption further hinders law enforcement in all areas. In Mexico the
police officers on the ground are part of an institution of corruption, one that
is focused on a self-centered mindset, not rule of law. This again stems from
a mistrust in the government; that one should take any and all precautions to
help oneself, because the political system is unreliable. While Russian police
forces have historically used extortion and bribery in their enforcement, the
economy of Russia has grown, allowing for economically supported change,
as well as less incentive for the Russian officers to line their own pockets. In
2011, the Russian government overhauled its police force by firing 170,000
allegedly corrupt officers and raising the remaining officers’ salaries.7 Aimed
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at combating corruption, this reform was sweeping in its efforts to address
the chronic enforcement issues identified by the government. This can only
happen in a country with strong interest articulation. When the citizens
are dissatisfied, they voice their opinions to elected officials or through
their votes; which, in Russia’s case, created a need for police reform. It is no
coincidence that this is happening now in the post-Cold War era. The now
strong, reorganized variant of Russian law enforcement is a sharp contrast
from the decentralized and unregulated policing of Mexican law enforcement.
Yet, China has comparatively weak interest articulation compared to Russia,
as the political agenda is tightly controlled by the Communist party. However,
this grip on policy allows for effective change to be implemented quickly. As
such, gun restrictions, regulations, and penal codes can adapt to a changing
social landscape faster than it can in Russia and Mexico, which holds as
another reason for low crime rates in China. To expand, China’s flourishing
economy causes Russia’s to pale in comparison. The corruption that persists
in Chinese governance and enforcement can allow economic growth to continue and the authoritarian hold on policy making to subsist. This can then
cycle back into itself, as “the survival of a relatively strong state, in turn, can
help to prevent the worst types of corruption from dominating society and
market activities.”8 Policing to ensure social harmony is a key aspect of law
enforcement in China. In 1991 (China stopped reporting police staffing in
1992), 34.9 percent of The People’s Police were “social order police” and
only 20.4 percent of officers were traffic or criminal police.9 While one could
argue the semantics of the different types of police officers, it is clear that
law enforcement is used just as much as a social tool as it is a peace one.
However, after Mexico’s PRI party was removed from presidential power
in 2000, how come Mexican democratization did not improve conditions
in law enforcement? According to Daniel Sabet, the current political culture in Mexico creates “…a lack of horizontal accountability between the
municipal president and the city council and… a lack of reform continuity
across administrations… these two factors generate systematic obstacles to
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institutional change.”10 These accountability problems find their beginnings
in the cultural disassociation that the Mexican people have with government,
seated in a history full of revolution, dissent, and a strong caudillo system
that exists throughout Latin America. While the Russians have had almost
30 years removed from their authoritative ruling party, the Mexicans are
still dealing with the recent repercussions of a paradigm shift, as well as
internal violence from organized crime. China, more authoritarian than
either of the other two countries, has been capable of a tranquil domestic
existence, thanks to the cultural upbringing of the population. Therefore,
differences in policing originate from cultural and system wide conflicts,
not simply numbers.
By connecting the examples explored, we can conclude that Mexico’s
police inefficacy is tied to the developmental shortcomings, identified as a
lack of political involvement on the local level and little incentive to improve, thanks to the government’s impotence. Furthermore, Russia’s marked
improvement in the field of law enforcement is linked to its increase in
interest articulation, as well as its stronger horizontal accountability and
civic involvement. Until the Mexican government and nation are able to
address the blockages in the system by changing the culture of policing
and aversion towards rule of law, organized crime will continue to flourish,
with Mexico as its casualty. China has been successful in maintaining a safe
social society, while contributing to the development of a civil one. Are
the costs to democracy, despite political legitimacy worth it? For now, the
Chinese people agree. Despite arguably similar ideologies in authoritarian
governments, the political development of China, Russia, and Mexico has
led to different outcomes in policy enforcement.
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